Causation in Cases of Evidential Uncertainty: Juridical Techniques and Fundamental Issues by Oliphant, Ken
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 91 
Issue 2 Causation, Liability and Apportionment: 
Comparative Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
Article 9 
5-16-2016 
Causation in Cases of Evidential Uncertainty: Juridical Techniques 
and Fundamental Issues 
Ken Oliphant 
University of Bristol 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ken Oliphant, Causation in Cases of Evidential Uncertainty: Juridical Techniques and Fundamental Issues, 
91 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 587 (2016). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol91/iss2/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 






      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 80 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
08 OLIPHANT-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2016 2:58 PM
587
CAUSATION IN CASES OF EVIDENTIAL UNCERTAINTY: 
JURIDICAL TECHNIQUES AND FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
KEN OLIPHANT
INTRODUCTION
The topic of “causal uncertainty”1 is rather large, and is here ad-
dressed only from one particular angle. The focus of this article is on that 
particular subset of issues of causal uncertainty that is termed “alternative 
causation” and it looks at that subject matter from a comparative legal per-
spective in connection with liability in the law of torts (or non-contractual 
liability for damage, which is the more common term in Continental Eu-
rope).2 In this context, “alternative causation” refers to a situation where 
there are two or more rival explanations of how the claimant’s injury was 
caused, and the defendant’s tortious conduct is part of one explanation, but 
not part of the other(s). It is a case of “either . . . or . . .,” rather than 
“both . . . and . . . .” Admittedly, questions of alternative causation often 
coincide in real cases with questions of “additional” or “cumulative” causa-
tion, but analytically they are distinct and should be addressed separately.
The classic illustration of alternative causation is the well-known 
“hunters case,” where two hunters fire negligently in the direction of an 
innocent bystander, who is injured by a bullet, but it cannot be determined 
This is the revised text of the author’s keynote address delivered at the conference Causation, liability 
and apportionment: an interdisciplinary perspective: Law, Economics and Philosophy held at the Cour 
de Cassation (Supreme Court) in Paris on September 12, 2014.
Professor of Tort Law, University of Bristol.
1. For the author’s previous work on this topic from the perspective of English and comparative 
law, see Ken Oliphant, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in England and Wales, in
PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 121 (Israel Gilead et al. 
eds., 2013); Ken Oliphant, Uncertain Causes: The Chinese Tort Liability Act in Comparative Perspec-
tive, in TOWARDS A CHINESE CIVIL CODE: COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 395 (Lei 
Chen & C.H. (Remco) van Rhee eds., 2012) [hereinafter Oliphant, Uncertain Causes]; Ken Oliphant, 
Alternative Causation: A Comparative Analysis of Austrian and English Law, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
HELMUT KOZIOL ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 795 (Peter Apathy et al. eds., 2010); Ken Oliphant, Propor-
tional Liability, in INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
179 (Bea Verschraegen ed., vol. 1 2010); Ken Oliphant, Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.
(2002), in LANDMARK CASES IN THE LAW OF TORT 335 (Charles Mitchell & Paul Mitchell eds., 2010); 
Ken Oliphant, Uncertain Factual Causation in the Third Restatement, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1599 
(2011) [hereinafter Oliphant, Uncertain Factual Causation]; Ken Oliphant, Loss of Chance in English 
Law, 16 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 1061 (2008). 
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588 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:2
from whose gun it was fired.3 Even applying the common law’s relatively 
low standard of proof—the balance of probabilities—neither hunter was the 
cause of the bystander’s injury because neither was more likely than not the 
source of the bullet that did the damage.4 The same pertains a fortiori if a 
higher standard of proof, as is found in France and other civilian jurisdic-
tions, is applied.5
The hunters case provides a simple and striking example of the diffi-
culty that arises where there are alternative causes of the claimant’s injury 
and neither can be proven to have actually been causal under the orthodox 
standard of proof. Similar difficulties arise in other recognizable categories 
of cases, e,g., where the failure to diagnose a medical condition means that 
the patient is deprived of the chance to receive treatment, and hence of the 
chance of recovery; or where a group of people is exposed to a toxic sub-
stance that increases the incidence in that population of a given health con-
dition, but it cannot be shown which of those developing the condition 
were injured by the toxin, and which of them suffered the condition inde-
pendently.
Such cases highlight a number of deficiencies of the orthodox ap-
proach whereby the claimant must prove the existence of a causal link be-
tween the defendant’s tortious conduct and the damage, according to a 
specified and generally applicable standard of proof (depending on which 
country one is in, it could be the “balance of probabilities,” “the conviction 
of the judge,” or some alternative standard).6 Amongst the most significant 
criticisms7 are the following:
3. In the United States, see Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). In Canada, see Cook v. 
Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830 (Can.).
4. Assuming that each hunter fired only once, or fired an equal number of shots, and there were 
no other circumstances pointing to one rather than the other.
5. On standards of proof, see Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 VT. L. REV.
469 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM.
J. COMP. L. 243 (2002); Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence Versus in Time Conviction: A 
Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and Continental European Law, 33 VT. L.
REV. 435 (2009); Ivo Giesen, The Burden of Proof and Other Procedural Devices in Tort Law, in
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008 49, 53–55 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2009); Michele 
Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 659 (2003); Vibe Ulfbeck & Marie-
Louise Holle, Tort Law and Burden of Proof—Comparative Aspects. A Special Case for Enterprise 
Liability?, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, supra, at 26, 28–29; Richard W. Wright, Proving Facts: 
Belief Versus Probability, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, supra, at 79. 
6. See sources cited supra note 5.
7. For useful overviews, see ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 1–83 (2001); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory 
Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (1984); Glen O. Robinson, Multiple 
Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); David Rosenberg, 
The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV.
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(a) “All or nothing” is unfair because crucial differences in outcome 
can result from small differences in probability (especially between 50% 
and 51% cases, where the balance of probabilities test is applied, or per-
haps between 89% and 90% where the standard is “a very high probabil-
ity”).8
(b) Under-deterrence results where the defendant’s activity (recurrent-
ly9) only adds to an independent background risk, and does not exceed it10
(where the balance of probabilities test is applied; the force of this criticism 
is even stronger if a higher standard of proof applies).
(c) There is a lack of sanction for fault/breach-of-duty in such a case 
because the defendant can continue a harmful and unreasonable activity 
without the threat of liability in tort (the “empty duty” argument).11
(d) Alternatively, over-deterrence results if the defendant’s activity 
habitually more than doubles the background risk because the defendant 
will be made liable for more than the damage that is actually caused by his 
activity.12
In many legal systems, the weight of these considerations has been 
recognized through the development of a number of juridical techniques 
designed to alleviate the deficiencies of the orthodox approach.13 Some of 
these maintain the all-or-nothing outcome of the orthodox approach. These 
include the reversal of the burden of proof and the use of inferential evi-
dence—for example, the recognition in France of “presumptions” (pré-
somptions graves, précises et concordantes)14 or through the common 
LAW FROM A GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE 140–41 (Fiona Salter Townshend trans., 2012); Helmut Koziol, 
Comparative Conclusions, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
685, 777–80 (Helmut Koziol ed., 2015).
8. For judicial recognition of this point in England, see Lord Nicholls’s dissenting opinion in 
Gregg v. Scott [2005] UKHL 2 [1]–[60], [2005] 2 AC 176 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) (appeal taken 
from Eng.).
9. See generally Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 
J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1990).
10. Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 424, 428; Levmore, supra note 9, at 698; Israel Gilead et 
al., General Report: Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability: Analytical and Comparative 
Report, in PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 
1, 37.
11. As to the empty duty argument, see Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. [2002] 
UKHL 22 [62], [2003] 1 AC 32, (Lord Hoffmann) (appeal taken from Eng.); Gregg v. Scott [2005] 
UKHL 2 [4], [2005] 2 AC 176 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) (appeal taken from Eng.); SANDY STEEL,
PROOF OF CAUSATION IN TORT LAW 269 (2015); Donal Nolan, Causation and the Goals of Tort Law, in
THE GOALS OF PRIVATE LAW ch. 7 (Andrew Robertson & Hang Wu Tang eds., 2009). 
12. Gilead, supra note 10, at 37.
13. See infra Table 1 and discussion infra Part II.
14. See Duncan Fairgrieve & Florence G’sell-Macrez, Causation in French Law: Pragmatism 
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law’s doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.15 Other juridical techniques allow the 
successful claimant to recover only a proportion of his overall loss (“pro-
portional liability”). The award of damages for loss of chance may be men-
tioned as a well-known example, as well as liability for materially 
contributing to risk and “market share” liability.
Table 1: Alternative Juridical Techniques














As will be demonstrated below, the ad hoc, under-theorized recourse 
to such techniques—though remedying some of the injustice caused by the 
law’s orthodox approach to causation—has also led to a measure of inco-
herence because such developments have not generally been based on a 
principled approach to fundamental issues. This article therefore aims (I) to 
set out a simple framework of principles within which legal responses can 
be gradated according to the merits of different categories of cases, and 
then (II) to apply that framework to a number of typical scenarios of uncer-
tain causation.16
I. A PRINCIPLED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The ad hoc development of juridical techniques to solve problems of 
causal uncertainty has tended to obscure the fundamental issues of justice 
at stake. The scope or range of application of these techniques does not 
adequately distinguish the different categories of cases in which problems 
of causal uncertainty arise. What is needed therefore is a conceptual matrix 
that can be used to create a hierarchy of case categories that are then 
matched to the appropriate legal response, whether that be full liability, 
proportional liability, or no liability at all.
15. The seminal case in English law is Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H & 
C 596, 159 Eng. Rep. 665.
16. My approach is indebted to the conceptual analysis advanced by Israel Gilead et al., supra
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The approach elaborated here has two aspects, which may be termed 
(A) “ranking” and (B) “matching”.
A. “Ranking”
“Ranking” involves the development of an analytical framework that 
enables different categories of cases to be ordered according to a principled 
hierarchy. The criteria employed to affect this ranking express a few simple 
common-sense ideas:
First, looking at the justice of imposing liability on the defendant, 
even if it is not certain that the defendant tortiously caused damage to the 
claimant, liability may still be justified where it is certain that the defendant 
tortiously caused damage to someone, even if it is uncertain whether the 
claimant was the actual victim. Liability may also be imposed, though the 
case for it is less strong, where the defendant merely tortiously risked the 
causation of damage, and it is uncertain if this risk—rather than some inde-
pendent risk—eventuated at all.
Conversely, looking at things from the claimant’s side, the claimant
has a strong claim to receive damages when it is certain that he or she suf-
fered tortious damage, even if it is uncertain by whom it was caused. The 
claimant may also be entitled to damages, though the case for their award is 
less strong, where he or she was tortiously put at risk of suffering damage, 
but it is uncertain if this was the risk that eventuated.
The case for liability is weakest where both causation and fault are 
uncertain—for example, where it is not known whether the defendant was 
responsible for some part of the tortious risk, and it is also not known 
whether the claimant was in fact exposed to the tortious risk rather than a 
background risk that may also have eventuated.
The interplay of these factors is illustrated by Table 2, infra, in which 
the considerations at the top of each column, addressing the respective 
perspectives of defendant and claimant, give the strongest reasons for im-
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Table 2.
The Defendant . . . The Claimant . . .
. . . tortiously caused damage to 
the claimant.
. . . suffered tortious damage caused by the de-
fendant.
. . . tortiously caused damage, 
but it is uncertain to whom.
. . . suffered tortious damage, but it is uncertain by
whom.
. . . tortiously risked the causa-
tion of damage, but it is uncertain if this 
was the risk that eventuated.
. . . was tortiously put at risk of suffering damage, 
but it is uncertain if this was the risk that eventuated.
. . . may or not have been re-
sponsible for some part of the tortious 
risk.
. . . may or may not have been exposed to the tor-
tious risk.
B. “Matching”
Using this hierarchy, it is possible to consider what type of outcome is 
appropriate for each distinct category of case: full liability, proportional 
liability or no liability.
Table 3.
     STRENGTH OF REASONS FAVORING LIABILITY
The argument advanced here is not that there is necessarily a “correct” 
outcome in any particular category of cases, but merely that it should be 
ensured, at a minimum, that the overall distribution of outcomes reflects the 
hierarchical ranking of the reasons favoring liability in each type of case. In 
principle, full liability should correspond to situations where the arguments 
in favor of liability are strongest; proportional liability should apply where 
the arguments in favor of liability, though less strong, are still significant; 
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and no liability may be the desirable outcome where the arguments in favor 
of liability are weaker still.
II. APPLICATION TO FOUR LIABILITY SCENARIOS
A. The Indeterminate Defendant
The first category is indeterminate defendants.17 In this scenario, the 
claimant (C) was wrongfully exposed to the risk of harm by two or more 
defendants (D1, D2, etc.18) each acting independently. The risk eventuates 
and C is injured. It is known that either D1 or D2 was the cause, but it can-
not be proven on the balance of probabilities which of them actually caused 
the injury. This, of course, is the situation that is exemplified by the hunters 
case.19 An alternative illustration is employers’ liability for mesothelioma 
following exposure to asbestos. Where the claimant was employed by sev-
eral employers, each of whom exposed him tortiously to asbestos, it may 
not be possible to prove which exposure(s) triggered the cancer.20
In such cases, it seems that most legal systems have an exceptional 
rule allowing liability, in some measure, to be pinned on each of the de-
fendants.21 The reasons for doing so are strong, bordering on the over-
whelming. On the one hand, the law is simply putting the claimant in the 
position he or she would have been had there been no tort at all; on the 
other hand, it merely imposes the cost on those who are proved to have 
acted wrongfully towards the claimant. The alternative is to leave the prov-
en victim of tortious injury without any remedy at all, and to relieve the 
actual tortfeasor of responsibility simply because others behaved wrongful-
ly towards the victim too.
A variety of juridical techniques are employed. One is the reversal of 
the burden of proof as found in the common law of the United States22 and 
Canada.23 The same approach is adopted in the U.S. Third Restatement of 
Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, which provides:
17. See generally John G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 511 (1994).
18. The “etc.” should be treated as implicit in what follows.
19. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
20. See Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 (appeal 
taken from Eng.). Obviously the issue does not arise in the same way in legal systems where workers’ 
compensation displaces employers’ liability.
21. See generally Oliphant, Uncertain Factual Causation, supra note 1, at 1603–04, 1611–16; 1
ESSENTIAL CASES ON NATURAL CAUSATION 353–89 (Bénédict Winiger et al. eds., 2007).
22. Summers, 199 P.2d at 1.
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When the plaintiff sues all of multiple actors and proves that each en-
gaged in tortious conduct that exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm and 
that the tortious conduct of one or more of them caused the plaintiff’s 
harm but the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove which ac-
tor or actors caused the harm, the burden of proof . . . on factual causa-
tion is shifted to the defendants.24
Turning to codified civil law, the German Civil Code has a specific 
provision to deal with alternative defendants through a reversed burden of 
proof:
§ 830 BGB. Joint tortfeasors, instigators and accessories (1)
Where several persons have caused a loss by acting jointly and unlawful-
ly, each of them is responsible for the whole loss. The same applies 
where it cannot be ascertained which of several persons involved caused 
the loss by his conduct.25
This has served as a model for code provisions elsewhere (e.g. Greece, 
the Netherlands, Slovenia, China, and Japan).26
An alternative approach is to impose liability for material contribution 
to the risk of the damage occurring. This is the approach of English com-
mon law, which also allows the recognition of a causal link in such cases, 
but the resulting liability is proportional, not full liability.27
Whether in such cases each defendant should bear full joint and sever-
al liability—e.g., through the application of a reversed burden of proof—or 
only a proportional liability—e.g., on the basis of each defendant’s contri-
bution to the risk—is open to debate. Full liability is certainly more justifi-
able in this scenario than in others—to be considered shortly—where it is 
not possible to show to the normal standard of proof that the claimant was 
the victim of someone’s tort. If all the defendants can be traced and are 
solvent, the outcome is the same in any case: Either the claimant sues each 
of the defendants for proportional damages, and achieves full recovery by 
aggregating the sums thereby obtained, or the claimant recovers the full 
amount from a single defendant under a joint and several liability rule, and 
the defendant then recovers an indemnity from the other responsible par-
ties.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2010). 
25. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 830, para. 1, translated in Jörg Fedtke 
& Florian Wagner-von Papp, Germany, in, EUROPEAN TORT LAW: BASIC TEXTS  122 (Ken Oliphant & 
Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2011).
26. See Oliphant, Uncertain Factual Causation, supra note 1, at 1611; M [CIV. C.] art 719, 
para. 1 (Japan). A similar provision is also to be found in the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR). PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON 
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) bk. VI ch. 4 § 103 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., outline ed. 2008).
27. Barker v. Corus (UK) plc [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
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However, where one or more of the defendants is insolvent or cannot 
be traced, joint and several liability means that the entire loss may fall on a 
single defendant who, for purely practical reasons, is unable to recover any 
indemnity from the other(s) who also contributed to the tortious risk.28 This 
might well be considered unfair, especially in situations where there is a
large pool of claimants, as in many cases of toxic exposure at work or in 
the environment. A proportional liability rule means, by contrast, that the 
risk of insolvency amongst the defendants is borne by the claimant, which 
could also be considered unfair.
One way to reconcile these conflicting concerns would be to apply a 
rule of joint and several liability in indeterminate defendant cases, but at 
the same time to ease the burden on defendants—should that be deemed 
appropriate—by establishing a mutual indemnity fund to reimburse them 
for what they were in law entitled to collect from other responsible parties, 
but were precluded from obtaining for reasons of the latters’ insolvency or 
untraceability. This is the approach under section 3 of the Compensation
Act 2006 (United Kingdom), which imposes a liability in solidum for mes-
othelioma cases where liability rests on material contribution to risk: A 
defendant who cannot recover an indemnity from another responsible party 
is able to recover the outstanding sum from the Financial Services Com-
pensation Scheme.29
B. The Indeterminate Claimant
A contrasting scenario is that involving the indeterminate claimant.30
Here, the situations of the parties are reversed: It is the defendant who is 
known to have caused tortious injury, and it is the identity of the victim that 
remains indeterminate. In this scenario, there is a class of injured persons, 
each of whom was tortiously endangered by the defendant, and possibly
suffered injury thereby, in circumstances in which it can only be estab-
lished on the evidence that one or more indeterminate members of the 
group was actually injured tortiously by the defendant. The alternative 
cause of injury is some innocent factor (“background risk”). Examples 
include environmental toxins that cause an increase in illness or mortality 
rates amongst those exposed to them in a particular place, and a defective 
pharmaceutical product that causes harmful side effects amongst those who 
28. Id. at [89] (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry). 
29. ALEXANDER HORNE AND AMELIA ASPDEN, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, HOME AFFAIRS 
SECTION, MESOTHELIOMA: CIVIL CLAIMS 6 (2015) (UK).
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ingest it. For each victim, indistinguishable symptoms and outcomes might 
also have resulted from natural, or at least “innocent,” background factors.
The case for departing from the orthodox rules is less strong here than 
in the indeterminate defendant scenario, principally because it cannot be 
said that the imposition of liability serves to place the claimant in the posi-
tion he or she would have been in had he or she not suffered tortious injury. 
It is not established on the evidence that the indeterminate claimant suf-
fered any tortious injury at all; the injury could well have occurred anyway.
On the other hand, it may be considered undesirable to allow a de-
fendant who exposed multiple persons to risk, and is proven to have caused 
tortious injury to one or more of them, to escape all liability for it. That 
would relieve the defendant from responsibility for an injury we believe 
she or he has caused (even if it cannot be pinned down to a particular vic-
tim) and would leave the duty of care owed in such cases empty of con-
tent—assuming the “added risk” is insufficient to allow causation to be 
established under the ordinary standard of proof.
However, if liability is admitted in such a case—by way of exception 
to the orthodox requirements—it seems necessary that it should be propor-
tionate to the likelihood that the defendant was the cause of the harm in the 
individual case. Otherwise the defendant could end up paying for many 
times the loss that she or he has actually caused. That would in no way be 
justifiable in moral or ethical terms, and would seriously distort the defend-
ant’s incentives to take precautions and engage in appropriate levels of 
activity.
C. Indeterminate Causal Links Within a Closed Group
To be distinguished from both scenarios discussed to this point is the 
situation where there are indeterminate causal links within what may be 
termed a “closed group.” This is defined by two characteristics. On the one 
hand, there exists a group of injured persons (claimants) whose injuries are 
known to have been caused tortiously, but it cannot be shown by which 
member of a group of possible defendants they were in fact caused. On the 
other hand, there exists a group of defendants who wrongfully exposed the 
claimants to the risk of the injury they sustained; it is known that each of 
them has injured at least one claimant, but it cannot be shown who injured 
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This type of case might arise, for example, where several industrial 
defendants located in a particular place wrongfully release the same rare31
toxin into the environment, causing distinctive injuries that bear the “signa-
ture” of the toxin released. Alternatively, several pharmaceutical manufac-
turers distribute a drug that similarly causes distinctive injuries bearing the 
drug’s “signature,” but there is no way of telling whose drugs each patient 
took.
It would seem that the case for at least some liability is stronger here 
than in both scenarios previously discussed. The (different) considerations 
pointing in favor of liability in each of the preceding cases are combined 
here. We know both that (a) every claimant was the victim of a tortious 
injury, and (b) every defendant has caused some tortious injury. It seems 
unreasonable to exclude the claimants from compensation simply because 
they cannot identify the particular wrongdoer who caused their injuries, and 
to deny the liability of every defendant simply because we cannot be suffi-
ciently sure which member of the claimant group each defendant actually 
injured.
Whether the liability should be all or nothing, or proportional, is per-
haps more difficult. Under the well-known market-share theory, liability in 
one sub-category of such cases is proportional, as recognized in the seminal 
U.S. decision of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.32 Looking at things afresh 
and from first principles, however, may throw the appropriateness of pro-
portional liability in this category of case into doubt. If there are indeed, as 
argued here, stronger arguments for departing from the orthodox require-
ments of proof in this scenario than in the simple case of indeterminate 
defendants, then one might argue for a liability at least as stringent as the 
full joint and several liability applied in the latter case in most legal sys-
tems.33 To have a weaker liability (proportional rather than solidary) seems 
actually to be incoherent. This is borne out if one considers the various 
categories diagrammatically. One sees immediately that the reasons for 
imposing liability in the “closed group” scenario are stronger than those in 
the indeterminate defendant and indeterminate claimant scenarios.
31. It must be assumed that the toxin is not independently present in the environment.
32. Sindell v. Abbott Labs. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
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Table 4:




1. Indeterminate Defendant Yes Not proven
2. Indeterminate Claimant Not proven Yes
3. Indeterminate Links in a Closed Group of 
Cs and Ds
Yes Yes
4. Risks partly within the victim’s sphere Not proven Not proven
D. Risks Partly Within “the Victim’s Sphere”
The last of the four scenarios to be discussed is where the alternatives 
are between the defendant’s tortious conduct and an innocent background 
risk. This is the last of the categories represented in Table 4 supra. This 
scenario arises where, for example, doctor D negligently fails to diagnose 
patient C’s illness and C subsequently dies, with the medical evidence indi-
cating that C would have had a less-than-even chance34 of recovering if 
properly diagnosed and treated.
Alternatively, a defendant, D, negligently releases toxins into the envi-
ronment in a particular place, and it is subsequently noted that illness and 
mortality rates there have increased; C is one of the victims, but it is not 
known whether the toxins were causal at all, or the increased illness and 
mortality were just statistical quirks. Should C recover, in either scenario, 
even though it cannot be proved on the orthodox approach that D caused 
C’s injury?
The justification here for departing from the orthodox rules of proof is 
much weaker than in all the preceding scenarios. It cannot be said on the 
ordinary standard of proof either that C has suffered a tortious injury, or
that D has caused one. Imposing liability neither puts C in the position we 
believe she or he would have been in had D acted with reasonable care, nor 
holds D responsible for an injury we believe she or he has caused (even if it 
cannot be pinned down to a particular victim). It seems undesirable to al-
low C, having failed to establish causation on an orthodox basis, to “have a 
second bite at the cherry” in the hope of succeeding, even if only in part, on 
34. Or, where a standard of proof other than the preponderance of the evidence applies, whatever 
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some alternative basis. That would be a case of “heads I win, tails you 
lose” (at least partly).35
Yet, a number of factors may lead us to question the justice of apply-
ing the orthodox rules of proof in such cases: (a) large and arbitrary differ-
ences in outcome can result from small differences in probability
(especially at the borderline between cases just under and just above the 
ordinary threshold, e.g., under a preponderance of the evidence rule, cases 
of 49% and 51% probability); (b) under-deterrence results where the de-
fendant’s activity only adds to an independent background risk, and does 
not exceed it; (c) the lack of sanction for breach of duty in such a case (the 
“empty duty” argument); and (d) alternatively, the over-deterrence that 
results if the defendant’s activity habitually more than doubles the back-
ground risk.
These considerations may lead us to think again whether it is appro-
priate to stick with the orthodox all-or-nothing approach in all cases when 
its outcome in practice is no liability at all. In fact, several legal systems 
already admit exceptions to the orthodox rule in particular circumstances—
for example, where a hospital patient’s condition is misdiagnosed and she 
or he receives the wrong treatment, thereby losing the chance of recovery 
provided by the correct treatment, or where a worker develops mesothelio-
ma after being exposed to asbestos tortiously in the workplace and non-
tortiously in the general environment.36 These exceptions testify to a strong 
feeling across different legal traditions that the orthodox approach to proof 
of causation can produce injustice, as demonstrated by the developments 
discussed below.
An oft-used juridical technique in such cases is the award of damages 
for loss of chance (especially in medical cases). Damages for loss of chance 
are accepted, for example, in France, Japan, and a majority of U.S. states.37
35. Cf. Gregg v. Scott [2005] UKHL 2 [224], [2005] 2 AC 176 (Baroness Hale): “[i]t would be a 
‘heads you lose everything, tails I win something’ situation.”
36. As it appears to have been assumed was the situation in Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Ltd. 
[2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 AC 229 (appeal taken from Eng.).
37. France: Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, Oct. 24, 1962 (unpublished),
RTD civ., 1963, 334 (Fr.); Cour de cssation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ, Dec. 14, 
1965, Bull. civ. I, No. 541 (Fr.); Florence G’Sell-Macrez, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in 
France: Part I: The French Rules of Medical Liability Since the Patients’ Rights Law of March 4, 2002,
86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1093, 1114–15 (2011). For Japan, see Robert B Leflar, The Law of Medical 
Misadventure in Japan, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 79, 95 (2012). For the United States, see the summary 
provided in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828–29 (Mass. 2008) (discussing that 20 states 
and D.C. have accepted and 10 states have rejected the approach). English law, by contrast, has so far 
rejected liability for loss of chance in connection with physical injuries, e.g., in the context of medical 
negligence. Hotson v. E. Berkshire Area Health Auth. [1987] AC 750 (HL); Gregg v. Scott [2005] 
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The patient recovers damages for being deprived of the chance of recover-
ing from the condition for which treatment was required—or at least of 
achieving an outcome better than that which eventuated—and the damages 
are proportionate to the chance lost.
A comparable outcome is achieved in other legal systems by deeming 
the defendant to have contributed to the harm to the extent of his or her 
contribution to the risk of the harm’s occurrence, as illustrated in the con-
text of clinical negligence in Austria,38 and employers’ liability for occupa-
tional exposure to asbestos in England and the Netherlands.39 Proportional 
liability was also endorsed in the Principles of European Tort Law:40
Alternative causes
(1) In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have 
been sufficient to cause the damage, but it remains uncertain which one 
in fact caused it, each activity is regarded as a cause to the extent corre-
sponding to the likelihood that it may have caused the victim’s dam-
age.41
Uncertain causes within the victim’s sphere
The victim has to bear his loss to the extent corresponding to the likeli-
hood that it may have been caused by an activity, occurrence or other 
circumstance within his own sphere.42
In some legal systems, by contrast, the mechanism adopted preserves 
an all-or-nothing outcome—for example, where there is a reversal of the 
burden of proof.43 Yet, reversing the burden of proof merely shifts the in-
equities resulting from the all-or-nothing approach without actually reduc-
ing them. Further, in practice, it places the entire loss on the shoulders of a 
defendant who has not been shown to have tortiously injured anyone, for 
38. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Nov. 7, 1995, 4 Ob 554/95, 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Justiz&Dokumentnummer=JJT_19951107_OGH00
02_0040OB00554_9500000_000 (Austria) (child suffocated by coiling of umbilical cord in womb).
39. Compensation Act 2006, c. 29, § 3 (UK) (reversing the decision in Barker v. Corus [2006] 
UKHL 20 in the specific context of mesothelioma); HR 31 maart 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU6092 
(Nefalit/Karamus) (Neth.).
40. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW (2005), 
http://www.egtl.org/Principles/index.htm.
41. Id. art. 3:103.
42. Id. art. 3:106. 
43. This is the typical approach of German law in cases of clinical negligence, though it is subject 
to somewhat restrictive conditions. Marc Stauch, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Germany,
86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1139, 1154–56 (2011); Marc Stauch, The 2013 German Patients’ Rights Act—
Codifying Medical Malpractice Compensation, 6 J. EUR. TORT L. 85, 90–91 (2015). Also adopting an 
all-or-nothing approach, the Compensation Act 2006, c. 29, § 3 (UK), applying to mesothelioma claims 
only, produces the remarkable result that full liability may result where the defendant contributes only a 
little to the overall risk to which the claimant was exposed. See, e.g., Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Ltd. 
[2011] UKSC 10 [4], [2011] 2 AC 229 (appeal taken from Eng.) (ruling that the defendant employer 
was liable for 100% of the claimant’s loss in circumstances where 85% of her total exposure to asbestos 
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the benefit of a claimant who has not been shown to have been tortiously 
injured. The reasons for allowing any exception at all to the orthodox ap-
proach are much weaker than those applying in the three scenarios dis-
cussed above, and it seems that the liability should, therefore, be less 
stringent—or, at least, no more stringent. Proportional liability, in one form 
or another, thus seems preferable to the simple reversal of the burden of 
proof and to other mechanisms that preserve an all-or-nothing outcome—
assuming any departure from the orthodox rules is to be permitted at all.
CONCLUSION
The short comparative survey undertaken in the previous paragraphs 
demonstrates very clearly that the development of a range of juridical tech-
niques to address perceived problems of uncertain causation has often pro-
ceeded in an ad hoc and unprincipled fashion, without regard for overall 
coherence. This article has argued for a more principled legal approach in 
which the appropriate legal response (full liability, proportional liability, or 
no liability) is adopted on the basis of a ranking of the different categories 
of cases in which problems of causal uncertainty can arise. This ranking 
reflects the strength (or weakness) of the arguments in favor of the imposi-
tion of (at least some) liability even though the uncertainty in regards to 
causation prevents the ordinary standard of proof from being satisfied.
The results of the ranking exercise to some extent go against prevail-
ing orthodoxy—at least as judged by the most common juridical techniques 
employed in various countries. According to the ranking adopted here, a 
more stringent liability is justified in the “closed group” category of cases, 
in which the market-share theory produces proportional liability, than in the 
category of indeterminate defendants, exemplified by the hunters case, 
where full liability on the basis of a reversed burden of proof is often ap-
plied. Conversely, where the potential causes include risks within the vic-
tim’s own “sphere,” the ranking suggests that the arguments in favor of an 
exception to the ordinary approach to proof of causation are at their weak-
est, which highlights the anomaly of preserving the all-or-nothing outcome 
for certain categories of such cases in some jurisdictions—for example, 
through a reversal of the burden of proof.
The argument here is not that there is necessarily a single “correct” 
outcome in any particular category of case, but merely that it should be 
ensured, at a minimum, that the overall distribution of outcomes reflects the 
hierarchical ranking of the reasons favoring liability in the various catego-
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examined and refined should facilitate the more coherent development of 
the law in this area in the future.
